Showing posts with label intrusion prevention applied. Show all posts
Showing posts with label intrusion prevention applied. Show all posts

Wednesday, September 19, 2007

Poor Macbook thieves

Thieves had stolen a set of Macbooks from a school in the northern Sweden according to this Swedish newspaper:

Macbooktjuvar klev rakt i fällan - IDG.se

However, what they did not know was that software from Orbicule had been installed. With this software they could among other things identify the computers new IP addresses and send pictures of the thieves from the built-in webcam. Then it was easy for the police to identify the thieves and capture them.

That is kind of an intrusion response system!


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Tuesday, April 3, 2007

"Signatures are usually based on vulnerabilities rather than exploits"

This is interesting, when I started to read about signature-based intrusion detection systems, I thought that signatures were created by using patterns from the exploit. However, as I noticed in a previous entry and learned from the post below (that I found via TaoSecurity), this is not the case.

Errata Security: ANI 0day vs. intrusion detection providers
signatures are usually based on vulnerabilities rather than exploits
This means that learning systems, like Polygraph, that generates signatures from exploits are not automating the signature generation properly. Though, they are able to block worms exploiting unknown vulnerabilities.

Friday, March 30, 2007

Mohit's security blog: IPS algorithms...

Mohit's security blog: IPS algorithms...

See what I wrote in previous blog entry.

Background reading: Polygraph - Automatically Generating Signatures for Polymorphic Worms

The next paper from RAID 2006 I will comment is about manipulating Polygraph. Thus it seemed natural that I looked at the original publication Polygraph: Automatic Signature Generation for Polymorphic Worms (2005).

Polygraph is a program that automatically generates signatures for Polymorphic worms; that are worms that change (obfuscate) their appearance from time to time between attacks. Existing worm blocking solutions (before 2005) assumes that worms have the same content from time to time. Thus it is easy to automatically generate signatures (simple single strings of bytes) that filter out worms. However, this assumption does not apply for polymorphic worms.

Since however, the polymorphic worms are targeting specific vulnerabilities some of the payload must be same between all worms, so Polygraph collects suspicious and innocuous payloads, classified using a simple flow classifier, and then extract content signatures from them. Instead of just extracting one single string of bytes, as in previous algorithms, Polygraph extracts sets of byte sequences.

The extracted byte sequences are used in three different ways for detecting worms :

  • All byte sequences must be present in payload to indicate an worm
  • All byte sequences must be present in correct order to indicate an worm
  • All byte sequences are weighed together using a Naïve Bayes Classifier:
    1. A byte sequence has probability being in a worm or not: P(seq | worm) and P(seq | ~worm)
    2. A score is computed for a payload being a worm were {seq} means all sequences in a payload: score = P({seq} | worm) / P({seq} | ~worm)
    3. Then the score is compared to a threshold and if true, the payload is believed to be an worm: score > tau
To handle the case that there are more than one type of polymorphic worms among the suspicious payloads, Polygraph uses hierarchical clustering of the byte sequences of the payloads. The sequences are merged into clusters by minimizing the false positives tested of the innocuous payloads.

Comment: First of all I think this an interesting paper, since I have a background in machine learning and Bayesian learning. However, the learning algorithms could probably be improved, for instance, by applying a more fully Bayesian approach than the used Naïve Bayes Classifier.

In addition I found an interesting comment at
Mohit's security blog: IPS algorithms... that is as follows:
Most signatures in good products are vulnerability based so even if you change the attack it still gets stopped.

Thus, Polygraph might not be needed! Or what should we believe?

Wednesday, March 14, 2007

IPS without signatures or log analysis

ForeScout is a company that claims to have an Intelligent IPS that uses
an entirely unique approach to preventing network attacks from "zero-day" threats such as self-propagating malware and hackers/espionage without using signatures, anomaly detection or any form of pattern matching technology. ForeScout's solution has proven its accuracy by detecting in real-time every self-propagating threat to date and has gained the trust of 100% of our customers who use the appliances in automatic blocking mode.


In summary: Malwares are detected when probing the network for vulnerabilities. Any request to a non-existing IP address is assumed to be a certain indication of a malware, thus it should be stopped. The IPS answers each malware request with some marked information, and when the malware sends a new request with the marked information, it can be stopped before it can make an real intrusion attemp.

Comment: This seems to be a neat solution. Though, if it is true: why is research in this area still needed?

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