Tuesday, September 2, 2008
Google Chrome uses BIBA security model
Friday, March 30, 2007
Background reading: Polygraph - Automatically Generating Signatures for Polymorphic Worms
The next paper from RAID 2006 I will comment is about manipulating Polygraph. Thus it seemed natural that I looked at the original publication Polygraph: Automatic Signature Generation for Polymorphic Worms (2005).
Polygraph is a program that automatically generates signatures for Polymorphic worms; that are worms that change (obfuscate) their appearance from time to time between attacks. Existing worm blocking solutions (before 2005) assumes that worms have the same content from time to time. Thus it is easy to automatically generate signatures (simple single strings of bytes) that filter out worms. However, this assumption does not apply for polymorphic worms.
Since however, the polymorphic worms are targeting specific vulnerabilities some of the payload must be same between all worms, so Polygraph collects suspicious and innocuous payloads, classified using a simple flow classifier, and then extract content signatures from them. Instead of just extracting one single string of bytes, as in previous algorithms, Polygraph extracts sets of byte sequences.
The extracted byte sequences are used in three different ways for detecting worms :
- All byte sequences must be present in payload to indicate an worm
- All byte sequences must be present in correct order to indicate an worm
- All byte sequences are weighed together using a Naïve Bayes Classifier:
- A byte sequence has probability being in a worm or not: P(seq | worm) and P(seq | ~worm)
- A score is computed for a payload being a worm were {seq} means all sequences in a payload: score = P({seq
} | worm) / P({seq} | ~worm) - Then the score is compared to a threshold and if true, the payload is believed to be an worm: score > tau
Comment: First of all I think this an interesting paper, since I have a background in machine learning and Bayesian learning. However, the learning algorithms could probably be improved, for instance, by applying a more fully Bayesian approach than the used Naïve Bayes Classifier.
In addition I found an interesting comment at Mohit's security blog: IPS algorithms... that is as follows:
Most signatures in good products are vulnerability based so even if you change the attack it still gets stopped.
Thus, Polygraph might not be needed! Or what should we believe?
Wednesday, March 14, 2007
IPS without signatures or log analysis
an entirely unique approach to preventing network attacks from "zero-day" threats such as self-propagating malware and hackers/espionage without using signatures, anomaly detection or any form of pattern matching technology. ForeScout's solution has proven its accuracy by detecting in real-time every self-propagating threat to date and has gained the trust of 100% of our customers who use the appliances in automatic blocking mode.
In summary: Malwares are detected when probing the network for vulnerabilities. Any request to a non-existing IP address is assumed to be a certain indication of a malware, thus it should be stopped. The IPS answers each malware request with some marked information, and when the malware sends a new request with the marked information, it can be stopped before it can make an real intrusion attemp.
Comment: This seems to be a neat solution. Though, if it is true: why is research in this area still needed?
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Thursday, March 8, 2007
OSSEC is gaining momentum
http://www.appliedwatch.com/blog/?p=6
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