Wednesday, September 19, 2007

Poor Macbook thieves

Thieves had stolen a set of Macbooks from a school in the northern Sweden according to this Swedish newspaper:

Macbooktjuvar klev rakt i fällan - IDG.se

However, what they did not know was that software from Orbicule had been installed. With this software they could among other things identify the computers new IP addresses and send pictures of the thieves from the built-in webcam. Then it was easy for the police to identify the thieves and capture them.

That is kind of an intrusion response system!


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Psychological warfare

From Anton Chuvakin Blog I read the following blog entry Why Security Is Useless. This is probably true, but that also makes me think: "well, then the only reasonable thing is to give up security". This resembles psychological warfare. As the Borg in Star Trek says: "resistance is futile"

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Tuesday, September 18, 2007

Sweden the third most used country for cyber crime

Sweden has according to a Swedish newspaper a lot of servers that are used for crime acts. Third position this year, last year we has the second position...

Kriminella avancerar på nätet

Chockhöjning av nya virus...

Well, I hope this might increase the funding for computer security at large and specifically intrusion detection.

Thursday, September 13, 2007

The misuse of intrusion detection

The same methods used for intrusion detection can also be used for detecting anything. The EU Justice Commissioner Franco Frattini wants to forbid searches for terror words such as "bomb" and "kill" and "terrorism". You might start to wonder what EU is going to become.

EU-topp vill förbjuda terrorord
EU vill blockera farliga sökord - IDG.se
Web search for bomb recipes should be blocked: EU

EU proposes anti-terror measures

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Friday, August 31, 2007

Richard on risk analysis and FAIR again

Richard at TaoSecurity is addressing FAIR again. This time I have come up with what I think is a pretty good argument in defense of FAIR. I wrote a comment at Richard's post but I cite it below as well:

Richard,

I think you are right in some aspects, that is: since with FAIR you do not usually have real data to make probability estimates and then you will not get as good risk estimate as you might wish.

However, in FAIR and similar frameworks you get help to elicit expert knowledge and transform it into a risk estimation. And the validity of this risk estimation is of course related to the validity of the expert knowledge: If you put garbage in, you get garbage out.

But, I think you are wrong when you are saying that the input to FAIR is arbitrary. Of course, if used incorrectly, the input can be arbitrary.

My question is: why would anybody that seriously wants to use FAIR make "arbitrary" input? Why not make "guesses" that are the best according to your knowledge? Then, based on the input and its modeling assumptions, FAIR will output the best possible risk estimation (at least if you believe in Bayesian statistics and decision theory..).

This means that you cannot make any better risk estimation based on the knowledge you have given as input without changing the FAIR model or adding more input.

So if you have to make decision that is the best according to you knowledge, then FAIR might work well.
What do you think?

Tuesday, August 28, 2007

FAIR is defended

Alex at http://www.riskanalys.is/ defends FAIR here and here.

In defence of FAIR, I think it should be possible to show that by making more fine grained decisions and then combine them, you get less errors than making a single monolithic decision. However I cannot come up with a good model that shows this. Maybe it is already done? Does anybody know?


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Monday, August 27, 2007

Riska analysis

There is a an interesting debate going on about the usefulness of risk analysis. TaoSecurity: Thoughts on FAIR.

I think Richard's arguments against risk analysis are quite convincing but I also think that a detailed analysis as prescribed by FAIR is better than a shallow one. I will come back to the reason later.